Despite the remarkable problems encountered by classificatory treatments self-referential propositions, virtually all 'solutions' proposed to the paradoxes generated by these prepositions consist, as Andre Glucksmann has put it, "either in ruling out such propositions as nonsenses, absurdities, or in accepting them while making a hierarchical distinction." and Hans Regne11 has pointed out that generally "the theory of the object-language and the metalanguage does not state the ' necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of the antinomies. Nor does it make evident why these antinomies sometimes, but not always, appear when the distinction between object-language and meta-language is ignored."' On the other hand, many solutions which seem to work require sacrifices (such as that of substitutiv!ty of identicals) which most of us v/ould be unwilling to make, as Fitch has noted.* These problems,
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and Hans Regne11 has pointed out that generally "the theory of the object-language and the metalanguage does not state the ' necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of the antinomies. Nor does it make evident why these antinomies sometimes, but not always, appear when the distinction between object-language and meta-language is ignored."' On the other hand, many solutions which seem to work require sacrifices (such as that of substitutiv!ty of identicals) which most of us v/ould be unwilling to make, as Fitch has noted.* Thus it is only those self-referential assertions, the truthclaims of which include in some way the truth-conditions of their object-senctences, that is, self-referential assertions concerning truth-conditions (either directly or through assertions of truth or falsity), which will be identified in their truth-conditions with their object-sentences and thereby rest indefinite in those very truth-conditions, due to the unending contingency of the latter on infinitely generated objectsentences.
Let us not consider assertions of the form ,M p' yields a falsehood when appended to a quotation of itself", where p is a predicate lacking an argument (e.g. 'is a string of German phonemes'). The truth or falsity of propositions such as this is contingent upon the definiteness of the truth-conditions of the sentence "'p' p" (e.g. "'Is a string of German phonemes' is a string of German phonemes") gener«.red from the embedded predicate, the non-obtaining of which in the world forms the truth-conditions for that original assertion, unless those sentences are identified.
Let us take an assertion of this form which Quine considers a genuine antinomy, '"Yields a falsehood when appended to a quotation of itself' yields a falsehood when appended to a quotation of itself."* The "'p' p"-form assertion generated by this assertion may be identified with the generating assertion or not. If it is identified, then the truth-conditions are identical and the definiteness of the generating assertion is contingent upon the definiteness of the generated sentence.
However, the truth-conditions of the first generated assertion involve another generated "'p' p"-form sentence with which it must be identical (if it is to be taken as truly identical to the first generating sentence) and thus upon the truth-conditions of which its own truthconditions are contingent. This contingency of generating sentence truth-conditions on generated sentence truth-conditions is infinitely extended through endless generation of "'p' p"-form sentences. Thus, again, no actual paradox is generated as the assertion infinitely regenerates an indeterminate element and thereby fails to fully define truth-conditions. Russell's paradox, as a problem of natural semantics, allows a similar, if somewhat more complex, solution.
Let us take the paradox under the form 'The description of all descriptions which are not included in their own extensions is included in its own extension. ' Obviously we have here a question of inclusion or non-inclusion of this very description in a certain set, and for any description to be included in this set it must not apply to itself, which is to say, it must not be included in the set or extension which it itself defines.
Thus we have two criteria which any object must fulfill to be included in the set in question:
1) the object must be a description and 2) it must not apply to itself.
Thus, clearly, 'large-nosed bipeds' would be included and 'descriptions in English' would not.
It is equally clear that descriptions such as 'descriptions of a particular sort', when spoken by our psychotic, who has no particular sort in mind, cannot be said to be included or not included; the assertion "'Descriptions of a particular sort' is a description of that sort" is not fully definite. Mow amongst the set of all descriptions we find 'descriptions which are not included in their own extensions', which, as a description, fulfills the first condition; however, its own extension, which must be definite as to its own inclusion or non-inclusion if it is to be taken as included or non-included in the original set, is defined by precisely those criteria which define the original set, with which set it is, indeed, identical. Thus the definition of the first set with regard to its own description is contingent upon the definition of this second set with regard to its own description, but it should be clear that this second definition is contingent upon yet a third, and so on infinitely, with all sets and all definitions identical and indefinite, leaving 'The description of all descriptions which are not included in their own extensions' indefinite at precisely the point at which it would define the conditions for the truth or falsity of 'The description of all descriptions which are not included in their own extensions is included in its own extension.' It may be objected here, following Kripke, that it makes no difference if we show single-sentence selfreferences to be non-paradoxical, as paradoxes might be generated by sentence pairs. Let us take the following pair 10 : A) 'B' is true. B) 'A' is false. It may seem that sentence A, for example, has fully definite truthconditions as it is clearly not identified with its object-sentence (i.e., clearly, '"B'is true"^"'A' is false"); however, it ia identified with the objectsentence of its object-sentence and, just as there is an element of indeterminacy in the original metalinguistic sentence, there is in this second objectsentence such an element of indeterminacy, which must ultimately be determinate if the truth-conditions of the metalinguistic sentence are to be fully determinate, for the determinacy of the truth-conditions of the first sentence is contingent upon the determinacy of the truth-conditions of this third sentence.
However, the determinacy of the truth-conditions of this third sentence is itself contingent upon the determinacy of the truth-conditions of the object-sentence of its object-sentence, that is, of some fifth sentence, itself, in turn, contingent, and so on infinitely. Clearly, the same holds for sentence B as well and, hence, neither is fully definite in its truthconditions. Related to this is the case of universally quantified assertions about assertions, which gives rise to another 'paradox', the "paradox of grounding in semantics."
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Obviously enough, an assertion of (natural) semantics of the form 'All sentences are x' necessarily generates the observation sentence "'All sentences are x' is x."
It does not follow from this, however, that universally quantified assertions of semantics are necessarily undecidable or paradoxical; indeed, it does not even follow that such assertions lack truth-value. First of all, if there is some other sentence 'p* such that "'p' is x" is false, then 'All sentences are x' is itself false. For example, the sentence 'All sentences are false' is not paradoxical, or lacking truth-value; it is simply false. 1 * Furthermore, 'is x' may not concern the truth-conditions of embedded sentences whatsoever.
For example, 'All sentences are composed of universal semantic units' will generate the observation sentence "'All sentences are composed of universal semantic units' is composed of universal semantic units", but the truth-conditions cf the embedded sentence are irrelevant to the truth o: falsity of this observation sentence. For any universally quantified assertion about assertions to even s-jsm paradoxical, its predicate must concern the truth-conditions of all embedded sentences of all observation sentences and it itself must be definitely unfalsified by all assertions excepting itself. However, only predicates of truthvalue fulfill the first condition and 'All sentences are true', 'All sentences are false' (as we have noted) and even 'All sentences are either true or false' or 'All sentences fully define truth-conditions' are false, and therefore fail to fulfill the second condition (while assertions such as 'All sentences the truth-conditions of which obtain in the world are true' or 'All and only sentences with determinate truthconditions are either true or false' are definitional and thereby have no observation sentences and no truthconditions, definite or not). 
